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Understaffed, Underfunded
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN NEW MEXICO,
1940S-1950S

David W. Engstrom, Alvin O. Korte, and Katie McDonough

I

n the 1940S and 1950S, formal policies and organizations replaced informal systems of caring for people throughout the United States. The
modern era of social welfare in New Mexico began in 1937 when the state
legislature passed the Public Welfare Act, a statute that operationalized the
state-level requirements of the federal Social Security Act of 1935,' Pervasive
poverty created great need for income support and social service programs.
At the same time, that poverty limited the state's ability to raise revenue for
funding social welfare. Because northern New Mexico was the poorest region in the state, social-welfare policy made its greatest impact there.
Today, with bureaucracy so ubiquitous, it is worth remembering that the
organizational capability of a state is not a historical given. Historians and
sociologists have noted that the absence of an established bureaucracy played
a role in the failure of the National Recovery Act to achieve corporatist-style
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economic management for the nation during the early days of the New
DeaJ.2 Historian Alan Brinkley argues that the New Deal "was also a process
of building government institutions where none existed.") What was true for
the national government was equally true for state government. New Mexico
struggled to create and maintain a modern bureaucracy to administer its
nascent welfare programs in the early years of their existence. Politics, administrative instability, recruitment problems, and staff turnover hampered
the organizational capacity and performance of New Mexico's Department
of Public Welfare.

National and State Context for Social Welfare in the 19408 and 19508
World War II altered the nation's commitment to assuaging poverty. Stimulating the economy through government spending produced unprecedented
prosperity. The process of defeating a common national enemy constructed
unprecedented social solidarity. Class divisions and economic poverty lost
the more central focus they had commanded during the Second New Deal
in the late 1930S.
Certainly, the robust postwar national economy created the perception
that most Americans were prospering and living comfortably.4 Despite that
perception, poverty was in fact widespread throughout the United States.
Although the nation lacked an official poverty measure until 1963, federal
officials attempted to estimate the prevalence of poverty. For example, Pres.
John F. Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisors conducted a retrospective study of poverty and estimated that, in 1950, 30 percent of all U.S. families lived in poverty.5 Another study suggested that, by the early 1960s, more
than 40 percent of American farm families lived in poverty.6
In spite of these statistics, historians have often characterized the postWo~ld War II era as a period of slow, incremental expansion of social welfare programs. Congress resoundingly defeated Pres. Harry S. Truman's one
substantive reform attempt of this era-the effort to attach a healthcare program to the Social Security Act - but legislators did add the caretaker Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments and create Title XIV
of the Social Security Act (Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled),
but added little else to the programs created by the Social Security Act of
1935 during the 1940S and 1950S. The election of Republican president
Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 did not, however, lead to a substantial rollback of social welfare programs, as some Democrats and reformers had
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feared. Instead, the Eisenhower administration supported tightening eligibility rules for most public assistance programs, such as AFDC and Old Age
Assistance (OM). One social welfare historian described the 1940S and 1950S
as "withering away" efforts to deal with poverty7
Poor relative to other states prior to the Great Depression and World War
II, New Mexico remained impoverished during the postwar years of U.S.
affluence. Existing evidence shows that there was considerable poverty in
New Mexico, especially in the rural, northern part of the state. In 1940 and
1945, the overwhelming majority of counties in New Mexico reported that
farm families had insufficient resources on which to live. The income and
resources of New Mexicans living in counties such as San Miguel, Mora,
Taos, and Guadalupe were one-third less than the level officials deemed
adequate. s A congressional report on poverty found that, in 1949, northern
New Mexico had the lowest average net income of commercial farmers in
the United States and was one of a handful of the poorest agricultural regions in the country.9
Throughout the 1940S and 195os, New Mexico consistently reported annual per capita income well below the national average. For example, in
1940 the per capita income for New Mexico, $375, was 37 percent lower than
tlIe national average, $599. By 1950 the income gap had narrowed to 28 percent: $1,163 for New Mexico and $1,491 for the nation. By the mid 195os, per
capita income in New Mexico was still 23 percent lower than the national
average-indeed, only twelve states had lower per capita income rates. lO
High infant mortality, a social indicator of poverty, reflected New Mexico's
low income levels. From 1941-1960, New Mexico led the nation in infant
mortality, reporting an average rate of 100.6 per one thousand births in 1940,
more than twice the national average of 47.0. Over the next fifteen years,
rates dropped in both New MexicC? and the United States, but the gap remained wide. In 1955, New Mexico had an infant mortality rate of 38,5 for
"white" and 87.3 for "non-white infants," compared with a national rate of
23.6 for "white" and {2.8 for "non-white infants" per one thousand births.!!
Both infant mortality and per capita income statistics indicate New Mexico
was experiencing pervasive and deep-seated poverty.

Context of Need in Northern New Mexico
During the 1940S and 1950S, despite the impact of newly created social welfare programs, northern New Mexico remained tlIe state's most impoverished
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region. Its endemic poverty and economic underdevelopment had deep
historical roots. Mter U.S. annexation of New Mexico in 1848, widespread
losses of land and natural resources were major factors contributing to the
region's economic decline. A conservative estimate is that, from 1854 to the
1930S, the Hispanic community lost 2 million acres of private land and 1.7
million acres of communal land. The state of New Mexico took 1.8 million
acres and the federal government appropriated one million acres more, all
without compensation. 12 The creation of national forests, coupled with previous land swindles, greatly diminished the agricultural resources available
to Hispanic families. Over the years, land division through inheritance further limited their acreages. Erosion, drought, and overuse reduced the productivity ofwhat land remained to those trying to eke out a livelihood through
ranching and farming.
After the railroad reached New Mexico in 1880, economic survival usually
required a few family members to leave their home in search of work and
then to return in the winter months. They traveled to southern New Mexico
to labor as pastores on sheep ranches; to the Tucumcari area to labor in la
escoba, the broom-corn industry; to Colorado to tend el betabel, the sugarbeet fields; or to Wyoming to work on cattle ranches or at la borrega, one of
the many sheep ranches. Others found employment on el tracque, laying
railroad lines to California. These workers, both men and women, had little
education but a pressing need to survive. Their in-and-out migration continued until the subsistence economy collapsed in the 193os.!3
In addition to land losses and job shortages, the absence of basic health
services translated into far too many Hispanics dying at birth, later suffering
premature mortality, or simply enduring chronic illnesses. Impoverished or
nonexistent educational systems limited many Hispanics to unskilled or entrylevel employment, if they could find it. These social ills, primarily the product of state neglect, led scholar and educator George I. Sanchez to call
Hispanics in northern New Mexico the "forgotten people."14
From 1929 to 1941, the Great Depression further strained families and
villages in northern New Mexico by closing off employment opportunities
in and out of state and weakening demand for agricultural goods. At the
height of the economic collapse in the 1930S, entire villages relied on the
Federal Emergency ReliefAdministration (FERA) to survive. Local resources
and institutions were grossly inadequate to provide relief. The depression
also seriously frayed the social and economic fabric of the region despite
the implementation of New Deal programs to preserve and strengthen village and rural life in the northern counties. 15
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Furthermore, the New Deal left only a tattered patchwork of programs
to address poverty. Work programs that directly fostered economic development, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (eee) and Works Progress
Administration (WPA), were phased out as the war economy created almost
full employment. The remaining federal and state poverty programs were
aimed at maintaining individuals through cash assistance rather than addressing the root causes of poverty. This approach assumed that dependent populations, such as children, the elderly, and the disabled, would be relatively
small and that working-age adults would participate fully in healthy regional
and national economies. Categorical cash assistance programs thus did little
to promote economic or social development in regions such as northern New
Mexico, which had long been isolated from the national economy and whose
working-age adults struggled to meet their families' material needs.
The structures that created the poverty-a reduced and often unproductive land base, high unemployment, low wages, seasonal labor migration,
and inadequate education, among others-remained in place during the
1940S and 1950s. Without many economic opportunities, individuals and
families in northern New Mexico began to rely increasingly on cash assistance as a component of economic survival. As welfare rolls and the cost of
welfare programs increased, public officials and citizens clamored for policies to deal with welfare dependency. Unfortunately, calls for welfare reform tended to blame individuals and families, without examining the reasons
for their dependency.

The Structure and Organization of Social Welfare
Prior to the New Deal, social welfare in New Mexico, comprised a mishmash of public and private responses to human need. For example, in the
rural northern part of the state, La Cofradfa de Nuestro Padre Jesus Nazareno
(Penitente Brotherhood) had long provided assistance to villagers. 16 Mutual
assistance societies such as the Alianza Hispana-America offered life insurance to their membersY Wealthy individuals such as newspaper owner and
politician Bronson M. Cutting were also sources of loans and outright gifts,
though the extent of this philanthropic activity is unknown. 1S At the village
or community level, individuals pooled their resources to create burial societies and to deal with unforeseen emergencies. These types of private
charity and mutual assistance - informal and personal- relied heavily
upon established village and family social relationships while modern social
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welfare, which is characterized by formal and public organizational structure and sponsorship, is "administered by strangers," and "paid for collectively by strangers."19 In contrast, New Mexico's system was informal and
personal.
In the area of public social welfare, New Mexico had initially developed
institutions to care for the poor, the sick, and the disabled, and instituted
modest local relief programs. For example, while still a federal territory,
New Mexico created the Orphans' Home (1884), the New Mexico Insane
Asylum (1889), and the New Mexico Asylum for the Deafand Dumb (1903),
and, when a state, it added the State Tuberculosis Sanatorium (1936). In
1915, the legislature passed a law that allowed counties and municipalities to
provide some minimum level of assistance to the poor. However, New
Mexico lagged behind other states in embracing innovative social-welfare
programs and services. Commenting on this early welfare structure, Thomas C. Donnelly noted that "the work of the state and other agencies was
far from adequate when the extent of the need was considered."20
Nationally, child welfare was one of the Progressive movement's rallying
cries. A national lobbying campaign created the U.S. Children's Bureau
(1912) and helped pass the Sheppard-Towner Act (1921), providing federal
monies to fund maternal and infant health services. At the local level, responding to the lobbying of New Mexico Progressives, the legislature established the New Mexico Bureau of Child Welfare (1919)-initially placed
under the Department of Education-to deal with "all matters touching
the betterment of children of the State." In 1921 the legislature expanded
the state's role in social welfare by creating the Department of Public Welfare (opw), which placed the Department of Health and the Bureau of Child
Welfare within the same organizational structure. 2\ According to Donnelly,
the rationale for creating the DPW was the desire to access Sheppard-Towner
funding, which required that New Mexico's child welfare services be brought
up to federal standards. The DPW, however, remained a relatively small department for the first ten years of its existence. By 1931, for example, the
entire budget was only $53,360, and the Bureau of Child Welfare employed
only five professional staff members. 22
Another example of New Mexico's tendency to respond slowly to Progressive initiatives was that New Mexico became the forty-fourth state out of
forty-eight to enact Mother's Pensions. 23 A movement away from institutional
care to more contemporary programming, Mother's Pensions sought to provide income and social services to maintain individuals in their own homes.
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The legislature required each county to pass a resolution adopting the provisions of the 1931 act before it could be administered locally. Although
county clerks processed the initial applications, staff from the Bureau of
Child Welfare was responsible for investigating the merit of each case. 24
The Great Depression moved the federal government to assume a permanent presence in social welfare. 25 The watershed New Deal legislation
that permanently altered the landscape of social welfare was the Social Security Act of 1935. Because the federal government had no national socialwelfare organizational structure, it relied primarily on the states to provide
the staff and expertise to administer all but a handful of programs, most
notably Old Age and Survivors Insurance. New Mexico's Public Welfare
Act of 1937 placed on DPW responsibility for administering the social welfare
programs created by the Social Security Act. 26 Existing social welfare programs, such as child welfare, were folded into the transformed and reorganized DPW, and most health programs were removed and· placed in the newly
created Department of Health. 27 Unlike many other states that alreadYhad
well-established welfare bureaucracies prior to the Social Security Act, New
Mexico was starting from scratch. To begin with, the state lacked large
pool of experienced workers or a sizeable philanthropic sector from ·which
to draw staff for the new state agencies. Except for running New Deal relief
programs and small assistance programs at the county level, New Mexico
had little bureaucratic infrastructure upon which to base its newly created
social welfare programs. 28 Furthermore, the state had no social-work education resources to aid the design and development of social welfare programs
or to train workers for staffing them. Indeed, the DPW had to recruit employees with the master's in social work from out of state. 29
New Mexico followed established norms and rules in administering its
public welfare programs. In all but two of New Mexico's thirty-three counties, the DPW created field offices that allowed residents to app~y for and
receive assistance in their counties of residence. The central office in Santa
Fe established uniform policy guidelines and coordinated and supervised
county operations. The DPW was responsible for overseeing four newly created public assistance programs: OM, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), Aid
to the Blind (AB), and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (Arm).
Additionally, the department was responsible for the child welfare services
that had been its primary function before enactment of the Social Security
Act. Finally, the department continued to administer state institutions such
as the State Tuberculosis Sanatorium in Socorro.

a
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Issues and Problems in Administering Welfare Programs
In the post-World War II decades, New Mexico was still controlled by political parties and factions that sought to maintain power by using government
jobs and resources as patronage. Writing about northern New Mexico in

1940, George I. Sanchez observed, "[Partisan political machines] devote
themselves exclusively to the promotion and administration of a spoils system form of government."30 Social welfare programs and services that redistributed income and provided jobs offered tempting targets for some political
actors who sought to employ the newly created programs for their own ends.
In that regard, New Mexico was far from unique. For example, in the midnineteenth century, William Marcy "Boss" Tweed of New York City's
Tammany Hall Gang served on the New York Senate Committee on Charitable and Religious Societies, thereby assuring a measure of access to public resources. As Theda Skocpol notes, in the late nineteenth century the
Republican Party effectively used Union Civil War pensions as a means of
currying favor and buying votes in national e1ections. 3l
In New Mexico, local and state politicians attempted to use New Deal
programs for patronage purposes. In 1935 Gov. Clyde Tingley forced out
Children's Bureau director Margaret Reeves "because she had steadfastly refused to permit the usual kinds of patronage with the relief organization."32
Three years later a federal grand jury indicted seventy-three individuals, including close associates of Sen. Dennis Chavez, for using the WPA as a political machine. The indictment alleged that work-relief positions were given to
obedient voters and that WPA workers had been used to "pack" a political rallyY
The Roosevelt administration realized that, to administer federal socialwelfare programming, it had to confer considerable authority on states and
localities regarding program size, operational rules and procedures, and the
qualifications and compensation of personnel. 34 Affording state and local
officials that power theoretically allowed them to respond to local conditions, but it also opened the door to a range of dubious practices that reinforced local power.J5The need to accommodate local interests in New
Mexico was made abundantly clear in the state's 1937 plan to restructure
child welfare services according to Title IV of the Social Security Act, which
created the ADC program and Child Welfare Services. The statewide plan
read: "Public officials will be consulted before the placement of child welfare case workers in local units.... Child Welfare case workers are assigned
with the consent and cooperation of local officials to the counties."36 Such
a caveat ensured the continuation of the patronage system in New Mexico.
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The interplay of politics and administration was visible on the Board of
Public Welfare, whose members were all political appointees of the governor. The board consisted of five members who served staggered six-year
terms. 37 The 1937 state welfare law vested the board with the power to "formulate and establish all policies, rules and regulations for the government
of the [department ],"38 and to oversee large programs and the allocation of
millions of dollars. In theory, its legal structure gave it considerable autonomy
from the executive and legislative branches of government.
In practice, the governor exerted substantial control over the department
through his power to make appointments to the board. Indeed, F. Chris
Garcia has argued that, until the 1950S, the appointment function of governors "or the power of patronage" was one of their major sources of influence. 39 Board members were supposed to be chosen "without regard to
political affiliations," but the timing of board turnover clearly suggested that
political considerations played an important role. A legislative investigation
of the DPW in 1955 concluded, "Board membership provides governors with
positions of prestige that can profitably be used to reward the party faithful."40 Furthermore, although the board hired the DPW director, its appointee was obviously cleared first with the governor. 4! Such practices ensured
that governors could influence policy behind the scenes without being held
politically accountable.
Although the Board of Public Welfare supposedly established departmental policy and exercised authority over the director, it was often illequipped to perform those functions. To begin with, much of the board's
work involved hearing welfare appeals and personnel issues. A study of board
activity from 1953 to 1956 found that only 20 percent of agenda items involved policy formulation. 42 Another study concluded that the lack of board
policymaking resulted in a departmental fiscal crisis. 43 The fact that the
board traditionally met only once a month hampered its policy making activities, and high turnover also limited the board's ability to oversee the DPW.
From 1937 to 1960, the board had eight different chairs, with anywhere from
six to eleven different members in each board position. Most of that change
occurred after gubernatorial elections, which took place every two years
during this period. Even under the most ideal circumstances, the work of
the board would have been demanding and difficult; the constant turnover
meant the board frequently had to perform its duties without full membership or with new and inexperienced appointees.
Rather than the board controlling the director, the director apparently
controlled the board. A legislative investigation of the DPW found only four
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instances over a period of three years in which the board overruled or
amended a decision made by the director. The report stated, "It would appear that the Director in fact formulates policy and administrative rules,
while the Board simply agrees to them."44
Instability and turnover characterized not only the Board of Public Welfare but also the office of director. With the frequent change in governors
came the replacement of DPW directors. One social work and welfare expert, Corrine Wolfe, explained, "What happened generally in this state was
that every time we changed governors-Republican or Democrat-they
would change the head of Welfare."45 Irene Cox, a former welfare official,
stated, "When the governor changed, the state director changed."46 The
director's position turned over nine times in that period; directors lasted, on
average, about 2.5 years.
Constant shuffling in the DPW directorship disrupted continuity in the
department's vision of mission. Each new director brought in a new management team and service philosophy. Writing in 1948, Mary S. Pino stated,
"Practices in the agency have always tended to reflect the philosophy and
ideas of the person directing the program."47 Describing the impact of routine leadership change, Wolfe stated, "[AJII kinds of programs started over,
depending on the individual and the interests of that particular man."48 A
recurring claim by the myriad of directors was the belief that many welfare
recipients were ineligible for benefits and were cheating the system. Such
concerns led to changes in the policy manual and periodic welfare-case
audits. Former county welfare director Agnes Seidel reflected: "It was uncomfortable whenever we had a change of administration. We knew that we
were going to face some kind of change."49 The biannual election of governors meant that each director had only one or two years to leave a mark on
the organization. 5o A new governor and new appointments to the board
resulted, all too often, in the director becoming a lame-duck official.
Quality ofleadership and knowledge of welfare policy and practice among
directors also affected the DPW. With a few exceptions, most directors had
little firsthand experience in administering a welfare bureaucracy and little
training in the application of welfare policy. Cox, another former county
director, observed, "We got some really completely unknowing state directors. Most of them knew nothing about welfare."5! Former director John
Jasper confirmed that most directors "had no training and no experience."52
"You would get a good one for two years," according to a welfare worker,
"and then you would get some horror for two years."53 And former county
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welfare director Facundo Valdez concluded, "Some of the directors that
they used to get for the public welfare department were the sorriest rinkydinks that you ever saw."S4 The professional background of DPW directors
ranged from lumberyard manager, and Santa Fe mayor, to'State Highway
Department controller, and accounting-firm administrator. The lack of
welfare expertise among directors suggests that governors viewed the directorship as a political patronage position and that political leaders regarded
the DPW programs as little more than charity work requiring no skill or training to manage.
The poor quality of organizational leadership negatively affected the professional staff that ran DPW programs and services. New Mexico relied on
welfare professionals to maintain programs while new directors learned about
the welfare policies and structure. Paradoxically, the directors apparently
ignored the expertise of welfare professionals. Former Child WelfarelPublie Assistance Supervisor Geraldine McKinney stated: "[Directors] had a
professional staff to begin with, but the new state directors tended not to
care what the professional people thought. They would say, 'Do it this way
or that is it.' They were not very patient with professional attitudes or ideas."ss
"The professional group really had no power," said Joe Paull, a child welfare official. "They could do their job as long as it was a technical job. But
when it came to policy, they were not listened to, but absolutely ignored."s6
Cox reflected, "The professional people there ... were just ignored, [and]
our suggestions and our ways of doing things, they just meant nothing."s7
The directors' routine disregard eroded staff morale and made more difficult the recruitment and retention of professionals. The most dramatic and
long-term result was mass resignations that occurred in the 1940S, 1950S,
and early 1960s, further weakening the department's already thin professional capacity. 58

Political Interference in Social Welfare Work
Political interference and policy disagreements had even greater impacts
on the staffing of county welfare directorships and other mid-level positions.
Mary S. Pino observed that "for the most part these public assistance directors resigned because they could not agree with the incoming state directors
on policies and procedures."s9 Many ofthese mid-level managers had received
professional training in social work and had accumulated considerable experience administering social welfare services. Despite the clear value of
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such professionals, the political environment often forced them to resign.
Former county welfare director Seidel pointed out: "[In the 195os] everybody was changed around, and that is when the Republicans came into
power. Because it had been Democrat all along, and that is when I think
[Edwin 1.] Mechem was the governor. Then the Republicans came into
power and they were going to change everything. I think the idea was to
shuffle their people around so they would quit, so they could put in their
fa vorites ."60
Recalling the consequence of a change in the governor, another welfare
official, Richard Reed, said: "It got conservative and the Republicans won
and we had to get out of there. They fired all of US."61 County welfare director George A. Engstrom remembered that, to find "dirt" on him, an assistant to the incoming DPW director interviewed his staff in a closed-door
meeting. Although not directly fired, Engstrom was effectively forced to
resign with the threat of a transfer to another county62 For others, the infusion of politics that created an environment inconducive to professional
practice led them to leave the department. 63
Perhaps the most important result of leadership turnover was the
department's inability to shield its civil-service staff from the influence of
local and state political interests. Interestingly, the merit system -one of
the hallmark "good government" reforms of the Progressive era-was intended to protect nonexempt civil service employees (those civil servants
who are not classified as political appointees) from political interference
and influence. In 1939 Congress amended the Social Security Act to require that state-run public assistance agencies operate under a merit system. The New Mexico DPW began selecting personnel on the basis of merit
in 1941. In other parts of the country, the basic principles of merit systems
worked to professionalize the administration of social welfare services, but
in New Mexico they apparently did not. Protection against improper political influence and performance-based retention of employees had no history in the state before 1941. 64
Although the merit system had supposedly begun to protect professional
civil-service positions in 1941, it never fully shielded covered (nonexempt)
staff. In the words of former county welfare director Valdez, "The personnel
system and the merit system in a sense [got] contaminated."65 Another welfare official recalled: "On the merit system. Oh, we had a little bit of a
cover, but it really didn't change completely. You had no surety of your job,
really. You never felt sure that you were there."66Mid-level officials found
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themselves pressured by politicians to use party affiliation as the basis of
personnel decisions. One former DPW director commented, "Some of the
personnel decisions in the local offices were influenced by local politicians."67
Former county welfare director Engstrom said that he had been asked to
reassign caseworkers at one of the state's institutions because they were associated with the party no longer in power. 68 -Extending beyond using political
patronage to staff local offices, politics also played a role in protecting workers whom welfare directors attempted to discipline or terminate. Former
county director Paull related the following story:
There was one [worker] who was stone deaf and she wouldn't admit it
and she couldn't hear five words the clients ever said, and I couldn't
get rid of her because her husband was a detective at La Fonda, the
house detective, and the [director] of the Department [DPW] was a
drunk. So he [hotel detective] was always rescuing this guy from the La
Fonda bar and driving him home, so he had terrific connections. This
woman who was working for me was a hopeless incomp~tent, but I
could never get rid of her because her husband had con'nections with
the [director of the DPW]. 69
Former county welfare director Cox, who was told to cut back on caseworkers, submitted a termination list to the state office. One of the soon-to-be
terminated caseworkers used her political connections to have her name
reinstated. 70
Political intervention also extended to client services, for politicians exerted influence over eligibility decisions as well. Former county director
Annette Smith recalled that a county chairman would bring constituents
into the office and say, "'Sign these people up,' you know, for welfare."71
Another county welfare director, Agnes Seidel, related: "In the early years,
there was this county chairman who would bring people in and he would
say, 'Sign these people up for welfare.' I wasn't a person that was going to
take orders from him and I didn't. That was why I was transferred to San
Miguel County, because we had a battle over one particular person he wanted
to put on, and the man wasn't eligible."72
For some county directors, the manual of policy and procedures offered
protection from political interference. Mila Viucich remembered: "There
were many times I was pressured by politicians, but I never gave in. The
thing that saved me was the manual. I would say, 'Look. Let me show you
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the manual. I can't do this.' I loved that manual because it saved me."73 At
other times, political pressure was more subtle. Valdez described the approach taken by a local politician:
He would come in and say I know that you have regulations and rules
that you have to work by; I am not worried about that. Th'ese people
outside have asked me to come and speak on their behalf, and this is
what I am going to tell them. If you help them with the regulations, I
am going to tell them that it was suggested they talk to me. If you don't
help them and you don't qualify them, I am going to tell them that it is
because you are an S.O.B.74
The statement made by former county director Engstrom sums up the pervasiveness of political intervention in departmental operations. Comparing
his experience in another state to that in New Mexico, he concluded, "I
didn't really feel a great deal of political pressure such as I did in New Mexico
as the county administrator."75 Neither civil-service regulations nor the policy
manual completely protected county directors and their staff from politicians determined to reward their operatives with jobs and constituents with
welfare services.
Recruitment, Retention, and Training

Public welfare casework was difficult and demanding. To begin with, eligibility determination required caseworkers to undertake the extensive review
of an applicant's financial resources and to have a thorough understanding
of federal arid state welfare policy. They also had to master interview and
assessment skills. Because applicants often had multiple problems for which
they were requesting assistance, caseworkers further needed to know the
full range of public and private programs and services that were available.
Changes in policy and eligibility rules meant that caseworkers were constantly reassessing existing cases.
During the 1940S and 1950S, the number of people receiving benefits and
services dramatically increased in the state of New Mexico. Indeed, by the
early 1950s, one of every twenty persons received some type of public assistance.76 Between 1940 and 1960, the number of OAA recipients more than
doubled from 4,483 to 11,018; nationally, the OAA caseload rose only 22 percent during that time. The number of ADC families underwent almost a
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fourfold increase, while the number of ADC children increased from 5,486
to 23,115, a growth of 421 percent. At the national level, the number of ADC
children rose by 170 percent, an expansion considerably smaller than New
Mexico's. The number of New Mexicans receiving AB increased only modestly in those years, and General Assistance caseloads actually decreased. 77
Child welfare caseloads, however, experienced tremendous growth. Between
1947 and 1959, the number of children in DPW legal custody more than
doubled (284 to 598), the number of children receiving child welfare services tripled (1,154 to 3,837), and the number ofadoption petitions increased
by 150 percent (493 to 1,235).78
Throughout the 1940S and 1950S, New Mexico rated among the highest
OM and ADC caseloads but ranked the lowest in average payments in the
United States. The year 1948 was typical: the OM program participation rate
was 335 per 1,000 elders (persons aged 65 and over), giving New Mexico the
tenth highest rate in the country. In the 195os, the ADC rate, varying from 47
to 55 per 1,000 children, was consistently 50 percent higher than the national average and consistently placed New Mexico among the states with
the highest rates. Conversely, New Mexico's average payment to recipients
of both OM and ADC programs was constantly near the bottom. For example,
in 1948 the average ADC grant in New Mexico was $54-62, $11.59 less than
the national average, ranking the state thirtieth in the nation. 79
The Public Welfare Act of 1937 increased the time investment in each
welfare case by requiring at least one home visit per year by a caseworker to
maintain client eligibility. The physical size of New Mexico-the fifth largest
state in the Union, with 121,599 square miles-and poor road conditions, especially in the northern part of the state, made contact with clients a labor- and
time-intensive activitY. Commenting on the problem ofvisiting clients, Seidel
remarked, "That was the hardest job of my life when I worked in San Miguel
County, because there were no roads to speak of over there."8o Former county
director Cox recalled, "Well, there were places where the caseworker drove as
far as he could and then he rented a horse. Because the road had run OUt."81
Valdez remembered that a worker "had to at times rent a horse in order to get
across the Canadian River to service people on the other side."82
In the 1940S and 1950S, the DPW struggled to attract and retain employees.
The department recognized that the complexity of social-welfare program
work required a competent and seasoned staff. The 1952 Annual Report stated:
"Public welfare programs are social services involving personal dealing with
thousands of people in trouble, frequently discouraged and distraught. The
innumerable complex social problems brought to the welfare offices require
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a staff of stable, intelligent men and women to make just and sound decisions to cope with situations."83 Despite professing the linkage between competent staff and th~ delivery of quality services, the DPW failed to act on this
knowledge. Several factors help explain the difficulty of securing a stable
professional staff.
The enactment of the merit system in 1941 had an unintended negative
consequence for staffing and salaries. In the merit system, the DPW, the
Department of Public Health, and the Employment Security Commission
each made appointments from the same registered pool of merit-systemqualified workers. The salaries in the DPW were lower than those in the
other two agencies; if workers had a choice, they went to the higher paying
agency, leaving DPW positions unfilled for long periods. (Federal policy left
to each state decisions about personnel compensation; New Mexico had
the power to remedy the salary discrepancies - but it did not.) The DPW was
well aware of the problem it faced. One year after creation of the merit
system, the DPW noted the need "to increase salaries within the Department
to the level of salaries paid by other agencies in the Merit System."84
Nevertheless, the issue of low salaries persisted. A 1945 Annual Report
noted, "[I]t is also recognized by the Board and Director that salaries paid
by the Department are lower than those paid in other state organizations
requiring similar qualifications for their staff."85 In the 1951 Annual Report a
personnel table shows that 79 employees left the department between 1 July
and 30 December 1950, while another 105 left between 1 January and 30
June 1951, for a grand total of 184 employees in the two periods. Of all these
departures, 37 or 20.1 percent left for higher pay.86 Justifying a pay raise in
1952, the department argued, "You cannot conduct a welfare program without staff and you cannot maintain a staff without paying a reasonable wage
commensurate with the requirements and qualifications ofthe job."87Echoing official statements, Annette Smith declared, "Why, the public welfare
workers made less than school teachers!"88 Another welfare official, John
Jasper, remembered that the salaries "weren't really good anywhere in the
department; they were very low."89
Comparatively low starting salaries were not the only financial impediment to staff retention. The department froze staff salaries and laid off workers to reduce expenses during periods of revenue shortfalls. The remaining
workers, already beleaguered with high caseloads, were thus assigned more
work without additional compensation.90 Revenue shortfalls also required
the recalculation of public-assistance payments, imposed more stringent
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eligibility standards, and necessitated the reassessment of eligibility of active welfare cases. In a frank admission that such practices were "wasteful,"
the department reported, "While it is difficult to evaluate, the productivity
of staff has been curtailed by frequent changes to policy and procedures,
staff reductions and salary 'freezes."'9!
Relatively low salaries and administrative instability fueled a chronic shortage of paraprofessional and professional staff in the DPW throughout the
1940S and 1950S. The outbreak of World War II severely depleted the
department's workforce during its crucial beginning stages of institutional
development. In the first six months of 1942, the department lost 70 percent
of its staff. The consequence "was to decrease the quality of services rendered."92 Three years later, an already understaffed department suffered a
further setback when seventeen social workers resigned en masse. They cited
inadequate General Assistance payments and the appointment of a director
whom they considered unqualified. 93 After the war, labor shortages continued to plague the department. Turnover rates-approximately 40 percent
in 1951 and 32 percent in 1952-remained high.
The shortage of professional workers was most keenly felt in child welfare services, long recogniz~d as one of the most difficult and complex ~reas
of social services. The department experienced a chronic shortage of child
welfare workers, due in part to advanced training requirements. The DPW's
Annual Report for 1948 described the complexity of child welfare work:
Whenever possible local child welfare workers are ... to work through
the particular problems that arise in that locality. Such services include
foster home placement and follow-up supervision of dependent and
neglected children; care of the unmarried mother and careful
planning for her child; investigations made for the Juvenile Courtin
cases involving children; the investigation of all adoption petitions
filed in that county; cilsework service to children who are presenting
serious problems within their own family setting; and casework service
to families who may be neglecting or abusing their children. 94
Such a broad range of responsibilities was shouldered by a bare-bones staff.
The initial Child Welfare Plan approved by the U.S. Children's Bureau
called for New Mexico to offer child welfare services in fifteen counties, but
the state had only five qualified workers. 95 Over the years the DPW made
uneven progress toward meeting the staffing needs of child welfare services.
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For example, in 1951 the state managed to place child welfare workers in
those fifteen counties, but had to rely on overworked and undertrained public assistance workers to handle child welfare cases in the remainingeighteen counties. 96 Six years later, the problem remained basically unchanged,
with sixteen counties lacking the services of a trained child welfare w~rker.97
To compensate for the professional shortage, the DPW placed trained workers in the counties with the highest caseloads and relied on four district
child welfare supervisors to oversee and monitor child welfare services.
Although the most acute need for professionally trained workers was in
child welfare, the DPW required skilled staff to oversee and administer its
other programs as well. Starting in 1944, the department attempted to increase its professionally trained staff by offering educational leave and scholarships for qualified employees to obtain master's degrees in social work. 98
By the mid-1950s, college graduates were recruited to enter the department
and given the opportunity to apply for educationalleave. 99 The lack of any
in-state, social work program retarded efforts to staff the department with
master's-level social workers and to train paraprofessionals-functions commonly associated with professional schools in other states. Nevertheless, the
DPW did attempt to create courses of study at state universities. In the early
195os, New Mexico Highlands University offered a modest set of social work
courses in the evening, while the University of New Mexico (UNM) provided
a limited number of courses through its Department of Sociology. However, UNM administrators resisted efforts by state and federal officials to establish a school of social work at the university.lOU
In 1951, under the capable leadership of Annabelle Sanchez, the DPW
created a training center in Albuquerque to orient new employees; later it
also provided training to county welfare directors. Once established, the
training center became one of the most important resources for enhancing
professional development in the state. The training center declared the relatively ambitious goal of giving "workers a beginning understanding of the
philosophy of public assistance, the function of the agency, the caseworker's
responsibilities, and some knowledge of the social and economic problems
as they affect the lives of people in New Mexico."lOl Joe Paull, a social worker
affiliated with the training of child welfare workers, recalled the "intensive"
training: "It hit the major child welfare concepts and principles. Always the
vast majority of the workers were untrained social workers."102 By the late
1950S, the center had developed a national reputation for the quality of its
training. 1u3
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To provide initial and ongoing training for its staff, the DPW relied on a
number of approaches. From the outset, the department's collection of social work books and periodicals, housed in Santa Fe, was made available to
all staff. County welfare offices were expected to provide basic training
through staff meetings, conferences, and district meetings. 104 Starting in 1950,
a monthly departmental newsletter summarized articles and books on social work and social services, and described social welfare services and programs. The most important strategy employed by the department was to
place its professionally trained staff in supervisory positions, thereby using
supervision as a tool of education as well as for monitoring staff performance. 105 Still, supervision as a form of staff training had its limitations; most
significantly, it could only focus on enhancing basic skills and knowledge. As
Cox stated: "The most I could do was to help the staff with attitudes and with
their role as caseworkers and ways of working with clients. There was no way
we could give ... professional training."lo6 Professional training would have
entailed two years in an accredited master's of social work program with an
emphasis on theoretical and empirical instruction. Social work consultants,
field representatives, and county welfare directors thus became the lynchpin
for staff training and development, but this approach was consistently weakened by the high turnover among county welfare directors.
During the 1940S and 1950S, the DPW was unsuccessful in recruiting and
retaining professional staff because of inadequate salaries, organizational
instability, and the lack of social work training within the state. The DPW
attempted ·to compensate by relying on paraprofessional staff, but the work
of the department suffered as a consequence of labor shortages and the
inability to staff professional positions. The department acknowledged the
problem in 1959 when it stated, "The fact that the helping process is not as
successful as it might be is voiced frequently by critical citizens and is recognized most acutely by the staff of the Department. The workers themselves
are most aware of the difficulties under which they work. Trained workers
are not available for the majority of social work positions."107

Financing Social Welfare in New Mexico
Two policies shaped the financing of public assistance programs in New
Mexico. First, the federal government set monetary ceilings and floors for
the payment levels of each assistance program. Second, the New Mexico
Public Welfare Act of 1937 required assistance payments to "be sufficient,
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when added to all other income and support available to the recipient, to
provide such person with a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency
and health."108 Set by the Board of Public Welfare, the "standard of need,"
the minimum income necessary for subsistence, became the benchmark by
which the department measured the adequacy of its assistance payments
and was set by the Board of Public Welfare.
Nationally, the general trend in the 1940S and 1950S was for the federal
government to assume greater fiscal responsibility for shared entitlement
programs such as AFDC or OM, and for social services such as child welfare.
In the 1936-1937 fiscal year, the federal government paid for only one quarter of social welfare expenditures, while the state of New Mexico incurred
the rest. The DPW'S 1941 Annual Report noted that the poverty ofNew Mexico
reduced its "financial ability to support the public assistance programs" and
that "the needs for the program are relatively higher than in other states."109
The DPW recommended greater federal contributions. New Mexico and
other states pressured the federal government to increase its proportion of
funding. Their efforts eventually paid dividends: Congress amended the
Social Security Act in 1946, 1950, and 1952 to enhance federal contributions
to state public aid. By the 1955-1956 fiscal year, the federal contribution
covered almost 60 percent of welfare costs in New Mexico.
Increased federal support for public assistance programs covered much
of the cost of steadily expanding caseloads, even as New Mexico progressively decreased the percentage of its annual budget devoted to public welfare. In 1946, the first post-Depression and post-World War II year, tax receipts
earmarked for public welfare represented almost 12 percent of state tax revenue. Ten years later, DPW payments accounted for 7.65 percent of all tax
revenue, and by 1958 that figure had shrunk to just 7 percent. 110
New Mexico did not fund its social welfare programs and services through
general appropriations. Instead, the state relied on earmarked taxes. State
government, not county government, was responsible for funding programs
such as ADC, OM, AB, and APTD. Initially, the DPW received funds from liquor
license, oil severance, compensating use, and corporate franchise taxes.
When revenues from these taxes did not yield enough to finance the department, the legislature, acting on the request of Gov. John]. Dempsey, levied
a sales tax on tobacco in 1943 to fund the OM program. 1lI For the next eight
years, the DPW relied on those five specific taxes to fund its operations and
programs. In 1951 the legislature diverted the oil severance tax to the state
general fund, thus depriving the DPW of needed revenue. Ironically, the
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withdrawal of the oil severance taxes directly contributed to a "welfare crisis" in 1955, forcing the legislature to award an annual appropriation from
general revenue to shore up the department's finances.
The DPW'S chronic problem of insufficient revenue to meet program goals
was a consistent theme throughout much of the 1940S and 1950S. For example, in 1942 the department stated, "The funds available for public assistance were insufficient to provide a reasonable subsistence for ... persons
in need of assistance." The concrete effects of such financial hardships on
the people of northern New Mexico were also noted. "It is difficult to picture the meaning of these low payments in terms of deprivation and hardship for recipients of assistance. The result, however, is'undernourishment,
inadequate medical treatment, and exposure from lack of adequate housing, clothing, and fuel."ll2 Ten years later, the DPW was still clamoring for
funding commensurate with program needs and goals. The 1952 Annual
Report stated, "Since the need for aid to dependent children was so pressing, the inadequate funds available were spread so thin as to cause failure of
full achievement of the purpose of the program."lIJ Indeed, the legislature's
decision in 1951 to remove the oil severance tax from the funding of public
assistance forced the DPW to "impose restrictive standards" on several of its
categorical assistance programs and to reduce average monthly payments
for every program except OAA. 1I4 One elderly man remarked to welfare caseworker Benjamin Lucero in San Miguel County, "jEs mejor que nos
pongan a nosotros [los viejitos] en una reserve!" (It is better to put us old
people on a reservation [than to live on what we get]!) Lucero also said
that the state was providing only about 35 percent of need at the time
(around 1951).1I5
One of the main culprits that handicapped the DPW'S ability to pay maximum standards of need was the yearly rise in the cost of living. Neither
federal nor state governments automatically adjusted public assistance payments to keep pace with inflation. During the postwar years, inflation was
I
of great concern to policymakers, includi~g DPW administrators. Commenting on the effect of rising prices, the DPW observed, "The postwar inflation
and the resulting in(;fease in the cost ofliving materially reduced the effective purchasing power of the assistance grants."116 Several years later, the
1958 Annual Report put a more human face on the bite of inflation into
assistance levels: "The rising cost of living is the basic reason why the Old
Age Assistance groups continually request increases in assistance payments.
There are few pressures growing out of the inadequacy ofAid to Dependent

J

48o?

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 79, NUMBER 4

Children payments but we ask the question, 'How can a dependent child
be fed, clothed and educated on $18.86 a month? Or $23.33?"'1I7
Fluctuations in the revenue generated by earmarked taxes had a profound effect on the consistency of public awards to welfare recipients. Tax
revenue from liquor and tobacco sales and on oil production responded
directly to the health of the national and local economies. During times of
economic prosperity, the DPW received state revenues sufficient to meet relatively high standards of need but still well below the maximum grants allowed by the federal government. During economic downturns, however,
the drop in earmarked tax revenue forced the department to make major
cuts in cash grants and to tighten eligibility standards. One former county
welfare director, Irene Cox, noted that when the need was highest, "there
was less money available."1l8 From 1937 to 1956, public assistance recipients
in the four major categorical aid programs experienced more than thirtynine changes in payment standards. Of those thirty-nine changes, seventeen were reductions. For recipients already living on the economic margins,
payment reductions created severe economic hardship; that adjustment was
especially difficult because the decreases in payments often came with little
or no warning from the state.
The consequences of revenue shortages extended beyond the ability of
the DPW to administer residual public-assistance programs. Poverty and high
caseloads were not evenly distributed throughout the state. Recipients of
welfare assistance were concentrated in northern New Mexico.n9 For example, leading the state in 1953 was San Miguel County with approximately
14 percent of its population receiving some form of public assistance. Other
.J
counties in the region recorded only slightly lower percentages: 9.8 percent
for Mora, 11.2 percent for Taos, 12 percent for Rio Arriba, and8 percent for
Santa Fe. Although constituting only 17 percent of the state's population in
1955, these five counties accounted for 33 percent of all active welfare cases.
By comparison, counties in southern New Mexico reflected significantly
lower percentages: 1.4 percent for Lea, 2-4 percent for Roosevelt, 2.5 percent
for Otero, 2.6 percent for Hidalgo, 2.9 percent for Curry, 3-1 percent for
Eddy, 3.3 percent for Chaves, and 3.7 percent for Luna.
Although public assistance programs might have protected dependent
populations from utter destitution, such programs played a negligible role
in the economic and social development sorely needed in northern New
Mexico. Policymakers noted that point in the mid-1950s. In a report issued
in 1955, the Appropriations Committee declared, "New Mexico has been
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supporting concealed local depressions in these areas, in large part through
the Department of Public Welfare." Administrators understood they were
not addressing root causes of dependency. "The Department is charged by
statute with making plans for removing the causes of dependency. It has not
done real work in that direction, but our distressed areas are obviously the
place it should start."IZO A case study of poverty and public assistance in San
Miguel County later concluded that improving educational and economic
opportunities were the best approaches to remedying endemic poverty.l2I
The state of New Mexico, however, failed to provide the DPW the resources
to address the roots of poverty common in counties such as San Miguel.
Addressing the structural causes of poverty and dependency required a
much different vision and role for the DPW. The statutory language that created the department clearly gave it leeway to experiment with innovative
community programs. However, a bureaucracy so inadequately funded and
barely able to operate its existing programs had little incentive or opportunity to be creative in social welfare programming. Moreover, there was little
political will in the state legislature or among the governors to mandate a
fresh and vital approach to welfare.
By the mid-1950s increasing public discomfort over growing caseloads
and the perception of mounting costs gave rise to clamor for welfare reform.
Although New Mexico had welfare-roll increases more dramatic than those·
of almost any other state, it followed rather than led national reform trends.
Throughout the country, including New Mexico, welfare reform did not
emphasize community or regional development, but rather trimmed
caseloads and discouraged people from applying for welfare. Focusing on
AFDC caseloads, some states attempted to winnow them down by strictly
enforcing provisions requiring a "suitable home" and a "man in the house."
Welfare reform in New Mexico was precipitated by a fiscal crisis in 1955.
The DPW essentially overspent its appropriation. To deal with the "welfare
crisis," Gov. John F. Simms called a special legislative session that provided
a fiscal bailout but also changed the eligibility rules for nearly all types of
assistance recipients in order to reduce. caseloads. Thus, expediency more
than ideology drove welfare reform in New Mexico. First, the legislature
voted in 1955 to allow newspapers to publish the names of OAA and AFDC
recipients, which ratcheted up the social stigma of welfare-a type of welfare scarlet letter. J22 Second, the Relative Responsibility Act of 1955 required
that immediate family members first exhaust their own resources before
anyone could be eligible for OAA; AFDC, AB, or APTD. 123 By passing the Relative
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Responsibility Act, New Mexico joined thirty-three other states in adopting
such a provision, and slightly more than half applied the provision to all
categories of public assistance. Finally, the legislature passed the Lien and
Recovery Act, which required that all applicants for OM, APTD, and AB allow
the state to place a lien on the property of recipients as a condition of eligibility.124 This followed the lead of thirty-four other states that had enacted
some type of restrictive property or lien law. New Mexico legislators designed these three reform measures to deter people from applying for various forms of public assistance and to reduce the cost to the taxpayers of
providing welfare.

Conclusion
This assessment of social welfare in New Mexico in the 1940S and 1950S
yields a number of conclusions. A myriad of problems existed within the
unstable bureaucracy of the DPW, as revealed by interviews with seasoned
veterans among DPW staff from the period and archival materials. The political and economic control of revenues and structures for DPW services severely hampered the department's ongoing contribution to the welfare of
the populace. In spite of the merit system, political interference affected
middle management and weakened efforts to professionalize social services.
The struggle to develop a professional base for the department had not yet
resulted in a sturdy, technical, organized, and powerful workforce in which
the opportunism and partisan political interests of each new government
could be resisted. When recalling their years of service in New Mexico's
public welfare system, former social welfare officials and workers expressed
their distress and sense of the chaos caused by the ever-changing political
influences.
Weak and unstable welfare bureaucracies face tremendous difficulty in
maintaining existing programs; they are poorly prepared for and even less
inclined to develop innovative programs. Although thousands of New Mexicans, especially in isolated and rural parts of the state, needed forms of income maintenance in the 1940S and 1950s, they also needed policies that
would foster economic development. For many, welfare provided the only
means of survival. The DPW was unable to envision and lobby for the economic development programs that were so desperately needed. When the
"welfare crisis" of 195 5 occurred, politicians and the DPW leadership resorted
to blaming welfare recipients for their dependency. Relying on harsh policy
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reform, policymakers attempted to spur recipients to self-sufficiency even
though the means for it-economic opportunity-were lacking in the first
place.
\
Although the welfare bureaucracy in New Mexico today is not weak in
the sense portrayed in this history, it can still be called "emerging." Recipients of welfare services continue to be blamed for their dependency, and
full attention has yet to be given to the issues noted here. In any region, selfsufficiency can be attained only with support from social, political, and economic policies that produce opportunity in partnership with the individuals
of that region.
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